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Predictions of the future have been with us since the early days
of humanity (Fig. 1). The desire to foresee the future, and to
some degree control it, is natural. Predictions in infectious
diseases have important implications for clinical practice and
resource use. In the current theme issue, we tackle the pros
and cons of predictions in infectious diseases.
Prediction models in infectious diseases may take several
forms. Prediction of new events will probably never happen, as
well pointed out by Neuberger et al.[1] in the current theme
issue. The introduction of a new pathogen, a major shift or
change in a known pathogen and a new pandemic are all
dependent on too many unknown factors that we do not
control, many of them concerning natural events [2]. Although,
ultimately, such events might determine the future of human-
ity, the prediction of such events remains a soothsayer’s
profession, and it is unlikely that we will ever be able to
foresee or control the emergence of new pathogens.
Once a new disease has been introduced and recognized,
modelling might assist in predicting its course and conse-
quences. Here, also, there are many unknowns, but Huppert
and Katriel defend modelling in infectious diseases, arguing that
mathematical models can and do provide useful predictions
during epidemics [3]. The authors note the methods used by
such models to overcome the problem of unknown factors,
and point to features that allow the identiﬁcation of successful
models. An important point to recognize is the effect of
models that forecast the course of a new epidemic. A wrong
model might cost health and lives. A model that exaggerates
the adverse outcomes and consequences of a new disease will
trigger panic and disruption of normal activities, perhaps
leading to loss of life, and having huge cost implications.
For the infectious diseases expert, it is clear how models
developed at the onset of an epidemic might exaggerate its
consequences. As time passes from the start of an epidemic,
our knowledge of the disease improves: awareness of the
disease increases, diagnostics improve, treatment becomes
available or is initiated earlier, immunity in the population
appears, and vaccines are produced. Because of these changes,
both transmission and adverse outcomes are reduced. The
pace of these developments is hard to predict and incorporate
into models developed at the onset of an epidemic. Ominous
predictions are credible; no one dares to contradict them. The
impetus for the current theme issue arose during the 2009
H1N1 (mini)pandemic. Countries across the globe reacted
dramatically to predictions of a 1918-like pandemic [4], altering
common clinical practice, reserving hospital beds, purchasing
vaccines for 100% of the population although vaccination has
never reached anything near full population coverage, stock-
piling antivirals, etc. PubMed and Google are curiously silent on
the costs of unused resources during the 2009 H1N1
pandemic. Lee et al. [5] provide interesting insights into the
challenges of modelling the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.
More credibly, modelling allows for testing of scenarios
within a well-deﬁned realm. Lee et al.[5] take us behind the
scenes of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and show us the
contribution of modelling to decisions regarding various
possible actions during the pandemic. Modelling determined
that school closure, social distancing and travel restrictions
would not be beneﬁcial, and might actually aggravate the
course of the pandemic. Modelling directed vaccine produc-
tion, and who and when should be vaccinated to most
effectively control the situation. Modelling of vaccination
effects has made a signiﬁcant contribution to the design of
childhood vaccination programmes [6], and directs vaccination
policies for varicella and herpes zoster [7], measles [8],
pertussis [9], meningococcal disease [10], human papilloma-
virus [11], and many other transmissible diseases. Similarly,
models of infection direct, for example, malaria elimination
efforts [12] and human immunodeﬁciency virus management
[13].
As we cannot predict the future any more than our
ancestors could (Fig. 2), we need to rely on real-time
identiﬁcation of events, be able to track their course precisely,
and respond in real time. This requires excellent surveillance
systems, global organization and coordination and plasticity of
clinical practice to accommodate changes in real time. Hartley
et al.[14] take us through the emerging technology of Internet
biosurveillance. Internet biosurveillance scouts the web for
pieces of information, turning hearsay and dispersed data into
intelligible information that allows sensitive detection of new
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epidemics and their evolution. Reliance on these and other
surveillance systems will probably be more cost-beneﬁcial than
preparedness based on prediction of future events.
Much less exciting than new viruses, rare pathogens, or
bioterrorism, but perhaps more relevant to everyday life in the
developed world, is antibiotic resistance development, for
which there is a lack of models. How will antibiotic use affect
resistance, and what will be the consequences of antibiotic
resistance in the near and distant future? Modelling antibiotic
resistance might provide a more structured framework with
which to quantify the costs of resistance and direct antibiotic
stewardship [15].
The recent experience with the 2009 H1N1 pandemic
raised doubts on whether models that attempt to predict the
future in infectious diseases are helpful [16]. We welcome
readers to formulate an opinion based on the reviews in this
theme issue.
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FIG. 2. Nostradamus. The Prophecies. Copy of Garencieres’ 1672
English translation of the Prophecies by Michel de Nostredame.
FIG. 1. Achilles consulting Pythia, the priestess presiding over the
Oracle of Apollo at Delphi (active 8th century BC). Roman carving.
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